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ARTICLE

The WTO Agreements and the Regulation
of Energy Markets: Is There a Good FiT?

RAVI SOOPRAMANIEN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A FiT regulation is a form of price regulation, in which
government entities pay energy producers (generators) a fixed or
premium rate for electricity, determined up front on the basis of
costs and profit expectations, for a fixed period, usually of between
15-25 years.1 FiT regulations obviate the need for a power
purchase agreement (PPA) with qualifying generators.2 Such
generators are typically paid the published FiT rates irrespective
of how much energy they can actually generate.3 RPS and EA
regulations, in contrast, are both forms of quantity regulation. In
a RPS regulation, private (retail) buyers are required to purchase
a specified amount (a percentage) of electricity from renewable

* Ravi Soopramanien is an attorney-at-law. He previously served as a Legal
Officer at both the African Development Bank’s Energy Department, and the
World Trade Organization’s Rules Division.
1. Toby Couture et al., A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design
72 (NREL Technical Report NREL/TP-6A2-44849, 2010), http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8E6-U3ZK].
2. Id.
3. These prices sometimes allow some flexibility for the government
purchaser to vary the price over time. See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIAL 751-53 (4th ed. 2015).
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energy (RE) sources.4 Compliance with a RPS regulation is
monitored through the exchange of Renewable Energy Credits
(RECs), which measure the generation and environmental
attributes of the RE source.5 RECs are usually tradable.6 A RPS
regulation may compel a retail buyer to negotiate a PPA with a
qualifying generator.7 However, such retailer may choose to
comply by purchasing RECs, or paying penalties instead for noncompliance.8 An EA regulation is something of a hybrid, used by
developing countries where the government is the dominant
purchaser of electricity.9 To generate more value for money than
possible under a FiT regulation, the government in question
invites competitive solicitations from qualifying generators
seeking to provide electricity generation, under a PPA, on the basis
of capacity for a fixed duration.10
Before discussing these regulations further, it is useful to
recall that the energy narrative is one inextricably linked with the
development of public international law over the past century. The
creation of the continental shelf regime, which kick-started the
development of the law of the sea, was driven by offshore
exploitation of oil and gas reserves.11 Expropriation, one of the
earliest customary international law norms to emerge under the
Statute of the International Court of Justice,12 developed largely

4. C.G. Dong, Feed-In Tariff vs. Renewable Portfolio Standard: An Empirical
Test of Their Relative Effectiveness in Promoting Wind Capacity Development, 42
ENERGY POL’Y 476 (2012).
5. KARLYNN CORY ET. AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 8-12 (2009),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8JT-F4CR].
6. See What Are Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs)?, BONNEVILLE ENVTL
FOUND.,
http://www.b-e-f.org/learn/what-are-renewable-energy-certificates
[https://perma.cc/U5LV-FR62].
7. See EISEN, supra note 3, at 758-65.
8. Id.
9. LUIZ T. A. MAURER & LUIZ A. BARROSO, ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF EFFICIENT PRACTICES 77-90 (2011), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2346/638750PUB0Exto00Box0361531B0
PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/G3UJ-F74Z].
10. Id.
11. Thomas Cottier, Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or
Enhanced Disciplines?, 5 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 40, 41 (2014).
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
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in the context of disciplining the nationalizations of energy
infrastructure, and stabilizing energy-related concessions granted
to foreign investors. The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and its various accords and
protocols, have all sought to curb states’ use of fossil fuel based
energy sources.13 In the absence of a dedicated multilateral energy
organization, a global patchwork of energy regulation has been
split between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), the Energy Charter (ECT), the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the WTO.14 This paper focuses
on the role of the WTO in global energy regulation. The WTO,
through its various Agreements, sets binding disciplines on the
cross-border trade in goods and services among WTO Member
countries. With 164 Members in its ranks, and Iran and Algeria as
the only two non-Members of note,15 it can be said that the WTO,
directly or indirectly, influences the modalities of global trade in
goods and services.
RE disputes are growing steadily in the WTO. In order to
understand how WTO jurisprudence affects the problem, it is
useful to classify cases in two waves that followed a period marked
by what some scholars characterize loosely as the RE armistice.16
The first wave, prompted by low-cost Asian RE equipment,
featured challenges to, or alleged reprisals against trade remedy
measures imposed by the United States on, Indian and Chinese
solar and wind RE electricity generating equipment. 17 The second

13. See Cottier, supra note 11.
14. The International Energy Agency linked with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also bears mentioning. In
recent years, it has grown into the world’s default research forum on energy
matters. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org [https://perma.cc/HW2DZFAT].
15. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 26, 2016), https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/V7Y2
-GUNV].
16. Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable
Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform, 15(2) J. INT’L ECON.
L. 525, 555-58 (2012).
17. Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/437abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU
9G-L9BB]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing and AntiDumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS449/AB/R
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wave of disputes has, more or less, flipped the script, as Asian
states in turn are challenging local content rules and feed-in-tariffs
maintained by developed states.18
This paper focuses on this second wave of WTO RE disputes.
It will assess whether or to what extent policy instruments
requiring increased use of RE in national electricity grids, notably
FiT, RPS and EA regulations, are consistent with WTO legal
obligations. Part II of this paper will discuss energy markets, and
the issues that are presented through incorporation of RE into
national grids. Part III will shift focus to the WTO. It will introduce
the WTO and relevant WTO law, with a particular emphasis on
the Appellate Body’s conclusion in its Canada – RE/FiT report.
Part IV will assess whether or to what extent WTO Member States
can enact FiT, RPS and EA regulations without fear of possible
WTO litigation. Part V will conclude with recommendations.

(adopted July 22, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/449abr_e.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZDQ-T8PP]; Appellate Body Report, China–Countervailing
and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the
United States, ¶ 6251, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Oct. 18, 2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/414abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5
WW-TSLP]; Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS419, China–Measures Concerning
Wind Power Equipment, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/8ANB-D5VX]
(in
consultation on December 22, 2010; amicably settled).
18. Appellate Body Reports, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in
Tariff Program, ¶ 7, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, (adopted May
24, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/412_426abr_a_e. pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4GV-L7XY] [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Renewables/FiT]; Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS452, European Union and
Certain Member States—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds452_e.htm [https://perma.cc/6KG2-VTED] (in consultation on
November 5, 2012; panel request pending). Bucking the trend, the United States
successfully challenged India’s use of local content requirements in its solar
industry. See Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/456r_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9GB-JPUH].
India
reportedly threatened to request consultations in relation to analogous United
States practice. See Tom Miles, India Questions U.S. Green Energy Incentives at
WTO, REUTERS, (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ahhindia-usa-trade-idUSL5N0D44K1 20130417 [https://perma.cc/H4BE-6CXU].
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II. THE ENERGY MARKET
A. Electricity
Electricity production is organized around four features that
make electricity a unique commodity.19 All energy grids must
accommodate these features in order to function properly. First,
electricity cannot be practically stored.20 It must be generated, as
it is needed.21 Managing electricity output to handle changes in
demand (load), accordingly, present logistical challenges. The
result is that the wholesale price of electricity can vary
considerably in the course of a day. Second, electricity takes the
path of least resistance.22 This means that there is no defined path
for electricity delivery: customers cannot choose the electricity that
they want. Indeed, every kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity
consumed by a customer is physically identical.23 It bears
mentioning, in this regard, that customers, inasmuch as they
purchase so-called “green” energy tariffs, are not purchasing the
direct distribution of RE-generated electricity into their homes.
Rather, they are usually paying for their energy supplier to invest

19. SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 30-32 (2002).
20. Id. at 30.
21. Pumped hydro is sometimes referred to as a form of electricity storage.
Id. at 30 n.11. However, what is “stored” is not electricity, but water, which is
saved for use in peak hours. Id. This water is propelled through a turbinegenerator to create electricity. Id. The past few years has seen innovations in
storage – not least of which Tesla Motor’s 6.4 kWh Powerwall units. See Seth
Weintraub, Tesla Begins Alerting 1st General US Powerwall Customers,
Installations Starting in June, ELEKTREK (Apr. 8, 2016), http://electrek.co/2016/
04/08/tesla-begins-alerting-1st-general-us-powerwall-customers-installationsstarting-in-june [https://perma.cc/4ATL-2ZF8]. However, such innovations have
yet to reach scale – Tesla reportedly scrapped plans to introduce a more powerful
10 kWh unit, as “the economics didn’t work”, and is rolling out the Powerwall on
a limited basis in June 2014 to owners of Tesla vehicles. Id. The 6.4 kWh unit is
scheduled to retail for $3000 a pop, once it is released. Id.
22. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 30-31.
23. William Hogan, Overview of the Electricity System in the Province of
Ontario (December 11, 2011), at 2, submitted as Exhibit CDA-2 in Panel Reports,
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector /
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Docs.
WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (adopted 24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate Body
Reports WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R), https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/412_426abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH84-JH92] [hereinafter
Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT].
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in producing more RE energy, or carbon offsets. Third, the grid is
interconnected: the introduction of transmission lines in one part
of the grid can impact flows elsewhere, and may even destroy
capacity on a grid.24 The interconnected nature of the grid makes
it particularly vulnerable to external events, such as the sudden
loss of output at a generation plant or a dramatic (and
instantaneous) change in consumer consumption.25 Fourth,
electricity travels at the speed of light.26 If the precise supply of
electricity fails to meet demand at any given moment, the
frequency falls and, if many loads fail, this can lead to a blackout.27
The grid, accordingly, must be managed by a single system
operator capable of calling on generators to raise or lower supply
to meet changes in loads in a matter of seconds.28
B. Electricity Markets
Since its commercialization in the late 19th century, electricity
was vertically integrated, and operated either by the state, or by
private operators as public utilities, a form of regulated
monopoly.29 Electricity markets proved resilient to competitive
regulation because, broadly speaking, regulators simply could not
fathom of any other way the industry could function: in addition to
the importance of having one system operator, all three traditional
functions of the industry, namely generation, transmission and
distribution, contained elements of a natural monopoly.30 At the
time, conventional wisdom dictated that there were potentially
infinite economies of scale to generation. This turned out to be
false: scale economies from generation are all captured at some
point.31 Even so, logistical and regulatory advantages remained to
siting generators next to each other.32 It remains the case,

24. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 31-32.
25. Id. at 32.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 24-26.
30. Id. at 37-38.
31. Nuclear reactors for instance cap out at 1 GW, whereas coal and gas
plants typically cap out at 650 MW. Id. at 26-27.
32. See EISEN, supra note 3, at 60-70.
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furthermore, that there are economies of scale in transmission and
distribution, reinforced by the visual and siting impracticalities of
constructing competing transmission and distribution cables.
In the United States, electricity was managed, for the most
part, by investor-owned utilities (IOUs). These were granted
monopoly franchises to provide electricity to specified geographical
areas. To proscribe utilities’ abilities to extract monopoly rents,
regulators in the United States set rates based on the cost of
service (rate-basing). These rates, which formed the basis of
countless litigation over the past two centuries, covered utilities’
fixed and variable costs, plus utilities’ cost of capital, including a
reasonable rate of return for its investors.33 Many countries
emulated important elements of the United States’ regulated
monopoly model.34
Outside the United States, for reasons of geography and the
importance of providing residents universal access to power, states
generally opted for a more centralized model, where the state
monopolized the electricity market. The United Kingdom had
centralized the provision of electricity services from the outset.35
This model was effectively exported to its colonies abroad. Under

33. Rate-basing was summarized as follows by the DC Circuit Court in Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v FERC: “[t]he utility business represents a compact of
sorts; a monopoly on service in a particular geographical area is grated to the
utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation
quite alien to the free market. . . Each party to the compact gets something in the
bargain. . . utility investors are provided a level of stability in earnings and value
less likely to be attained in the unregulated or moderately regulated sector in
turn, ratepayers are afforded universal, non-discriminatory service and
protection from monopolistic profits through political control over an economic
enterprise. Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless to say, not before us.”
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Starr, J., concurring). For a critical account of how operators could conspire to
game the system at the expense of ratepayers, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 20-57 (1988).
34. Hong Kong is one of the few that did. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
POWER SECTOR REFORM: THE EXPERIENCE OF FIVE MAJOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2 (David Victor & Thomas Heller eds., 2009).
35. This should be put into perspective, however. Up until a few years ago,
China was essentially adding capacity of 80-90 GW of electricity – roughly
equivalent to the United Kingdom grid. See Mayur Sontakke, Must-Know: China’s
Additions to its Power Generation Capacity, MARKET REALIST (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:19
PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/10/must-know-chinas-additions-power-gene
ration-capacity [https://perma.cc/V8BM-ERX5].
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Margaret Thatcher, however, the United Kingdom led the charge
in transitioning to a market-based approach.36 It did so by
unbundling generation into various competitive generators, and
splitting distribution between 12 companies, each serving a
specified geographical area.37 Generators and distributors were
required to trade power through contract, or submit bids through
a common pool.38 The United Kingdom experiment saw rates fall
drastically, prompting a global shift towards more market-based
solutions to national electricity markets.39 The United Kingdom
experiment also had profound implications for Commonwealth
nations such as Canada, which had followed elements of the
United States model into the 20th Century before developing large
vertically integrated state-controlled entities akin to those in the
United Kingdom (pre-deregulatory) model.40
The United Kingdom experiment inspired states throughout
the world to experiment with competition in electricity markets.41
Even the United States embraced competition, empowering the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to allow marketbased rates in certain instances.42 FERC Orders 888 and 889, in
turn, dramatically altered United States electricity markets. Order
888 mandated the unbundling of electricity and the separation of
marketing functions for these newly-disaggregated services;
required utilities to provide open access to their energy tariffs; and
36. See EARL REITAN, THE THATCHER REVOLUTION: MARGARET THATCHER,
JOHN MAJOR, TONY BLAIR, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN BRITAIN, 1979 –
2001, at 79-80 (2002).
37. Id.
38. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY REFORM
ABROAD AND U.S. INVESTMENT 16 (1997), http://www.abraceel.com.br/_anexos/
electricity_reforms_abroad.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CNV-AFV7].
39. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 5.
40. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION 377-81
(Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn eds., 1996).
41. For developing countries, these experiments have largely been
unsuccessful. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 254-306.
42. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d), authorizes
FERC to set market-based rates to power marketers that can demonstrate a lack
of market power. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012). It is noted in the
literature that the United States is constrained from following the United
Kingdom model owing notably to the fact that the United States grid was
developed largely by private industry. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 264. The
United Kingdom faced fewer conflicts of interests in transitioning to a competitive
market owing to its prior ownership of the English grid. Id.
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allowed existing utilities who had incurred sunk costs relying on
older regulations to recover their stranded costs.43 Order 889
proscribed utilities from sharing market information in any way
that would prevent access to this information by potential
competitors, and required all such information to be posted on the
Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS).44
Outside of the United Kingdom and the United States, the
push towards what the literature refers to as the “standard
textbook model of reform”45 has, empirically, failed to yield many
success stories to date.46 Instead of pure competition, the
equilibrium reached in some major emerging economies that
transitioned to competitive markets has been likened to a “dual
market” system, in which solvent investor-owned and insolvent
state-owned utilities coexist, buoyed by a mix of laissez faire
accountancy rules, subsidies, soft loans and other forms of “special
payment and financing arrangements.”47 There is, accordingly,
extensive government intervention in even those electricity
markets that have ostensibly transitioned to competition. This is
because of the various public interest needs to be met in the
provision of electricity.48 One such public interest need faced by
modern electricity concerns the challenge of incorporating an
increased supply of RE-generated energy as a response to climate
change. A given grid’s electricity supply mix is determined by a
range of factors, the most important of which being capital costs,
access to fuel and fuel costs, population density, transmission
access to population centers, geography, climate, grid reliability,
and, increasingly, policy decisions about acceptable environmental
impacts.49 A given supply mix in today’s national grids reflects two

43. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10,
1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35 and 18 C.F.R. § 385).
44. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10,
1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 37).
45. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 21.
46. Id. at 18 (discussing Chile’s transition to a competitive system).
47. Id. at 289.
48. Id. at 173 (discussing the Indian market, and the importance of universal
access).
49. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 3.
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sets of trade-offs, between providing electricity at a low cost, and
maintaining grid reliability; and balancing fossil fuel generation
with RE technologies.50 It follows that not all generators are the
same. They can be split into base, intermediate, peak, and RE
services.51
Taking Ontario as an example, base load generators, mainly
nuclear and hydro plants,52 operate between 50-80% of the time in
a given year.53 Such plants, which can also include coal-fired
thermal generators, have high capital costs, and low fuel costs.54
They take a while to power up, but once activated they can operate
at constant levels. The output of base load generators cannot be
changed rapidly to accommodate sudden changes in load.55
Intermediate load generators supply electricity when demand is
above minimum levels, but has not yet reached peak.56 These
plants, which include gas-fired steam-cycle, combustion turbine
and combined cycle generators, operate anywhere between 15-50%
of the time in a given year.57 Such plants have capital costs
comparatively lower than base load generators, but variable
(mostly fuel) costs follow the price of natural gas, and tend – until
recently – to be high.58 Peak load generators, notably single cycle
gas-fired turbines, internal combustion engine and pumped hydro

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Falling gas prices are increasingly allowing for gas-fired plants to serve
as base load generators. JOSEPH CULLENT & ERIN MANSUR, INFERRING CARBON
ABATEMENT COSTS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS: A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH
USING THE SHALE REVOLUTION 5 (2016), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~mansur/
papers/cullen_mansur_gasprices.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEH-W67E]. They are
not hampered by the slow start-up times mentioned above in relation to coal and
nuclear plants. Id.
53. See Hogan, supra note 23.
54. Id. at 3-4. For hydro generators, all direct costs are capital costs, as they
produce electricity from the energy of flowing water. Id. at 4. Variable costs for
coal-fired plants include the cost of fuel (coal). Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. See, Myra Saefong, Natural-gas prices aren’t done falling yet,
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/natural-gasprices-arent-done-falling-yet-2015-10-27 [https://perma.cc/JJE2-ZYSD]; Robert
Scott, Natural Gas Prices Are Falling Significantly, but Why?, MARKETREALIST
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://marketrealist.com/2016/11/natural-gas-prices-plunging/
[https://perma.cc/M8ZZ-NSLV].
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plants, provide electricity when demand is at its highest.59 Such
plants, which can be powered up quickly, may operate for only a
few hours in a given year.60 They typically have lower capital costs
than base and intermediate load plants, and comparatively higher
fuel costs.61
RE generators are something of an outlier on the grid: they
generally fall outside the first trade-off listed above, between
providing cheap electricity and maintaining grid reliability, and
rather implicate the second trade-off, between fossil fuel reliance
and greenhouse gas emission reductions. RE generator costs are,
mainly, capital costs: marginal costs, excluding operations and
maintenance costs, are practically zero.62 The flip side, however, is
that they produce electricity on an intermittent basis: during times
of high insolation or wind activity.63 With the exception of biogas,64
grid operators cannot call upon (dispatch) RE-generated electricity
at will.65 Due to this intermittency, and owing to high construction
costs and limitations in the present state of RE technology, RE
generators have been unable to produce power at the same
economies of scale as the other generators discussed above.
Accordingly, RE-generated electricity is both less effective and, in
the absence of regulation, more costly relative to these other
generators.
The competitive electricity market differs from a conventional
commodities market, where buyers and sellers can interact and
haggle over price and quantity with each other. Because of the
nature of electricity, any market transactions conducted more than
24 hours ahead of generation is deemed long-term planning.

59. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 6.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Marginal cost dips to the negative, if RE generators benefit from
production subsidies. See FRANK HUNTOWSKI ET AL., NORTHBRIDGE GRP., NEGATIVE
ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (2002), http://www.
nbgroup.com/publications/Negative_Electricity_Prices_and_the_Production_Tax
_Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE32-9UWH].
63. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 6-7.
64. Biogas, composed of methane, can be made from burning waste or
biomass to produce methane, the primary ingredient in natural gas. Id. at 7.
Biogas can be used in most gas-fired plants, once the methane is sufficiently
purified. Id.
65. Id. at 3-7.
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Within this 24-hour window, transactions in the spot market for
wholesale electricity are bid-based, and conducted both a day
ahead, and in real-time chunks of time intervals (of 5 minutes, in
Ontario66).67 In the day-ahead market, buyers submit offers, and
generators submit bids based on their short-run marginal-costs68
for specified quantities of electricity supplied, based on the
projected demand assumptions. Broadly speaking, these bids are
accepted in “merit order,” from least to most expensive.69 In the
real-time market, bids are accepted in merit order, with the price
of the last (and highest) competitive supply offer accepted setting
the market-clearing price across the board for a given time
interval.70
The wholesale market, in most instances, fails to provide
adequate revenue to sustain existing generators or incentivize new
market entrants. This leads to a so-called “missing money”
problem.71 Further, at the risk of oversimplifying, electricity in the
wholesale market is procured in a manner that effectively “locks
in” the conventional structure of the electricity market, with the
grid operator dispatching low-cost base load plants when demand
is low, the more expensive intermediate plants when demand rises,
and the high-cost peaker plants when demand peaks.72 Under a
FiT or EA regulation, RE-generated electricity is “must take” – the
spot market absorbs this energy first, before dispatching electricity

66. Id. at 37-38.
67. Id. at 15. For a more detailed explanation see Market Processes and
Products, CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, https://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/
MarketProcesses.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q39S-74ZM]. There is also a minuteahead market, which focuses mainly on the ancillary services on a second to
second basis. Id. As pricing is not usually implicated on this market, this paper
does not discuss it in any more detail.
68. William W. Hogan, A Competitive Electricity Market Model 17 (Oct. 9,
1993) (draft prepared for Harv. Elec. Pol’y Grp.), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/
fs/whogan/transvis.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZE6-8D5W].
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. INDEP. ELEC. SYS. OPERATOR (IESO), 2009 ONTARIO MARKET OUTLOOK 9,
http://www.ieso.ca/Documents/marketReports/OMO-Report-2009.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7667-W3FF].
72. Id. That peak load plants remain switched off until being dispatched, at
higher rates, keeps costs down and allows them to recoup on these costs upon
dispatch. Id.
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from conventional generators.73 The consequent drop in required
load drives wholesale prices down – as the last competitive supply
offer accepted, which sets the market clearing price, will be lower
than the price set in the absence of the “must take” RE energy.
Precisely how RE-generated electricity would fare in wholesale
markets in the absence of regulation is subject to some debate.74
C. FiT, RPS and EA regulations
Regulators worldwide have formulated a panoply of policy and
regulatory solutions to the “missing money” problem described
above, which in the absence of regulation would form a barrier to
entry for electricity generators in general. These solutions typically
take the form of tax incentives and payment subsidies.75 Tax
incentives will normally take the form of a production tax, remitted
on the basis of every kWh of RE electricity generated, and an
investment tax credit, remitted on the basis of qualifying facility
installation costs. Payment subsidies will normally be incorporated
directly into the terms of PPAs of the type discussed in the
introduction. To increase local buy-in for the resulting government
expenditure,76 emerging markets in particular have tended to
combine these subsidies with industrial policy measures, notably
73. As described in Current Energy Markets Discourage Renewable Energy,
CLEANTECHNICA (Oct. 2, 2015), https://cleantechnica.com/2015/10/02/currentenergy-markets-discourage-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/MG76-XWVM].
Due to low to zero marginal costs, RE electricity generated in compliance with
RPS regulation obligations is also, in practice, must take for economic reasons.
Id.
74. As I will explore in more detail below, the Appellate Body bought the
argument that wind- and solar-generated electricity would not have existed in
Ontario, but for government intervention. In other markets, it bears mentioning
that RE-generated energy is competitive enough to bid in markets. As some of
these RE generators operate with virtually no marginal costs, further, they are
able to bid negative energy prices. In some markets in the United States, this has
resulted in conventional energy generators being driven out of the market,
although the ability for wind producers to charge negative prices is itself largely
a function of United States production tax credits. See FRANK HUNTOWSKI ET AL.,
NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 6-9 (2012),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Negative_Electricity_Prices_and
_the_Production_Tax_Credit_0912.pdf [https://perma.cc/34E6-QD9L].
75. See, e.g., Michael Hogan, Follow the Missing Money: Ensuring Reliability
at Least Cost to Consumers in the Transition to a Low-carbon Power System, __
ELECTR. J. __, 1-7 (2016).
76. Literally!
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local content requirements (known in WTO terminology as importsubstitution measures), which require generators to source a
percentage of labor and capital costs locally.77 To transition away
from fossil fuel generators and promote the use of RE in national
grids, various governments have combined these incentives and
subsidies with FiT, RPS and EA regulations.78
As discussed in the introduction, FiT, RPS and EA regulations
are similar tools with different “entry” points to boost RE energy
sales. A FiT regulation is a form of price regulation.79 RPS and EA
regulations, in contrast, are forms of quantity regulation.80 RE
generators prefer a FiT regulation, as these regulations guarantee
them a fixed flow of revenue.81 This is particularly important,
where such generators are seeking to incur debt obligations. EA
regulations are a second-best solution. Governments will tend to
prefer FiT or EA regulations where they want to ensure a diverse
RE supply mix: the concern being that compliance with RPS
regulations, in particular, will push retailers towards the lowestcost RE electricity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments
may find FiT regulations comparatively more stable, given the
tendency of successful generators in RE auctions to bid too low,
sometimes leading to a default at the facility construction stage.82
RPS regulations are the least preferred by RE industry, in light of
the uncertainties of allowing market forces to determine the
reasonable price of power under a RPS regulation.83 As a result,

77. See Virginia Hildreth, Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT, 14
CHI. J. INT’L L. 702, 705-09 (2014); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Renewable
Energy Disputes in the World Trade Organization, 13 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.J. 1,
45 (2015), https://www.academia.edu/11551752/Renewable_energy_disputes_in_
the_World_Trade_Organization [https://perma.cc/N8GS-F3PR].
78. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., UNEP, FEED-IN TARIFFS AS A POLICY
INSTRUMENT FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND GREEN ECONOMIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10-15 (2012), http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_FIT_
Report_2012F.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9QL-WBQT].
79. See MAURER & BARROSO, supra note 9, at 78.
80. Id. at 79-80.
81. Id. at 133.
82. Id. at 131.
83. Which normally leads to investors requiring higher REC prices to
compensate for the risk. Derya Elyilmaz & Frances Holmans, Uncertainty in
Renewable Energy Policy: How do Renewable Energy Credit markets and
Production Tax Credits Affect Decisions to Invest in Renewable Energy?, Paper
presented at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Associations 2013 AAEA &
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the required return on equity for these competitive solicitations is
typically higher than in jurisdictions employing FiT or EA
regulations.84 In terms of effectiveness, recent empirical studies
suggest that FiT regulations generate more RE cumulative
capacity than RPS regulations.85 There are fewer studies
comparing EA regulations with FiT or RPS regulations. One such
study found that FiT regulations have generated more value for
money in Europe than auctions for wind-generated electricity,
after taking account of differences in wind resource.86 These
results should however be taken with a grain of salt as, in any
given jurisdiction, FiT, RPS and EA regulations are offered
alongside a range of other incentives, notably tax incentives and
payment subsidies.87 Whether or to what extent a FiT outperforms
an RPS, or underperforms an EA regulation should be assessed
against the complete suite of incentives.
As I will discuss in the following section, these three
regulations may present some tricky questions of WTOconsistency. While RPS and EA regulations have not featured in
either case law or trade law debates thus far, the argument can be
made that the purchase obligations in a FiT, RPS and EA
regulation all operate, in effect, as import-substitution measures.88
Such requirements, as I will discuss in the next section, are
particularly problematic from a WTO law standpoint.

CAES Joint Annual Meeting (Aug. 4-6, 2013), at 10-11, http://ageconsearch.
umn.edu/bitstream/150018/2/AAEA%20submissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBU6KGK6].
84. DAVID DE JAGER & MAX RATHMANN, POLICY INSTRUMENT DESIGN TO
REDUCE FINANCING COSTS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS ANNEXES
(2008). Although the authors do not address EAs, presumably, the IRR would be
comparatively lower with EA prices.
85. See Dong, supra note 4, at 483.
86. Lucy Butler & Karsten Nekkuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota
and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development 33 RENEWABLE
ENERGY 1854, 1864-65 (2008).
87. Indeed, the tax incentives and payment subsidies, cateris paribus, will be
more valuable in encouraging the entry of RE generators in the short term.
88. See Rubini, supra note 16, at 553-54.
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III. WTO LAW
A. The WTO Secretariat
The WTO is, essentially, organized around three pillars:
negotiations, monitoring and dispute settlement. Negotiations
under the first pillar are held under the auspices of the Trade
Negotiations Committee (TNC), mandated to negotiate deeper
market access commitments and binding rules. Monitoring under
the second pillar is carried out under the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM). Dispute settlement under the third pillar is
formally governed by the Membership acting jointly as the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).89 There is something of a fluidity to the
three pillars: Members negotiate new market access commitments.
These and pre-existing commitments are regularly monitored and,
where required, enforced by WTO dispute settlement. This
structure has been reversed lately, with Members seeking to push
new market access commitments through the backdoor of the third
pillar.90
WTO disputes are governed by the Understanding on rules
and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU)
annexed to the WTO Agreements.91 WTO disputes are inter-state
disputes, which are formally initiated at the request of a Member
(the complainant Member) in respect of any trade-related measure
adopted or maintained by another Member (the respondent
Member).92 These Members must first attempt to reach a
negotiated settlement, failing which the complainant Member may
request the establishment of a dispute panel, normally composed
89. See William J. Davey, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement:
Historical Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges, 17 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 679, 693 (2014). For a more detailed breakdown of the Secretariats’ work
within these three pillars, see WTO Secretariats, WORLD TRADE ORG.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7V9C2JLM].
90. This is because the WTO has grown too large for its own good, with 164
Members unable to decide on new trade disciplines. Note that the second pillar
operates constantly in the background – through regular committee meetings
convened by the Secretariat. As such, I do not discuss it any further in this paper.
91. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
92. See Id. at arts. 1, 2, 3.
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of three trade diplomats.93 The panel’s final report can be appealed
to the seven-judge Appellate Body on issues of law or legal
interpretation.94 A division composed of three Appellate Body
judges will review a given panel report.95 Nowadays, most panel
reports are appealed. Dispute settlement proceedings are subject
to strict time frames, of six months for completion of panel reports
and 60 days for completion of Appellate Body reports.96 Once the
findings and conclusions in these reports are formally adopted by
the DSB,97 the latter may recommend that the respondent Member
bring its measures into conformity within a reasonable period of
time.98 Upon expiration of this period of time, the complaining
Member can, in principle,99 seek to retaliate through
countermeasures by securing permission – from the DSB – to
suspend “concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements.”100 Such retaliation, which is prospective in nature,

93. Id. art. 8.5.
94. Id. art. 17.6. Currently, the Appellate Body’s composition is six judges,
following the United States’ veto of Jennifer Hillman’s reappointment. See Ravi
Kanth, Is the US Settling Scores with the WTO Appellate Body?, LIVE MINT (May
24, 2016), http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/mXEaSbM8h0dSomhueE8ePK/Isthe-US-settling-scores-with-the-WTO-appellate-body.html [https://perma.cc/HJA
8-D9MP]. This number may drop to five for some time, following the United
States’ recent threat to block the reappointment of Seung Wha Chang. Id.
95. DSU, supra note 91, art. 17.
96. Id. arts. 12.8, 17.5.
97. A plenary meeting of the WTO’s membership, essentially wearing a
different hat.
98. DSU, supra note 91, arts. 22.1, 22.2.
99. Where the parties disagree on the level of retaliation proposed by the
winning Member (which always occurs), the Members will refer the matter to
WTO arbitration, pursuant to DSU Art. 22.6. Id. art. 22.6. Such proceedings
should last no more than 60 days. However, in a typical case, the losing
respondent Member will make cosmetic amendments to the offending measure(s)
and argue that it has, in fact, complied with the DSB’s recommendations. Where
the complainant Member disagrees, fresh panel and Appellate Body proceedings,
if appealed, must follow pursuant to DSU art. 21.5. Id. art. 21.5. The 21.5
proceedings should ideally be disposed of before 22.6 proceedings are initiated –
typically by way of so-called “sequencing” agreements owing to some unfortunate
ambiguity in the DSU on this matter. Id. arts. 21.5 & 22.6.
100. Id. art. 22.2.
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may be fixed to a level “equivalent” to the level of economic harm
caused by the offending measure(s).101
B. WTO Law
The WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) all
discipline subsidies.102 Collectively, they draw a distinction
between production subsidies, which are presumed to be WTOcompliant, and import-substitution subsidies,103 which are treated
as something akin to per se violations of WTO law. Below, I address
the definition of a subsidy in WTO law, the legal basis for
disciplining production and import-substitution subsidies, the role
of markets in subsidies disputes, and how these three issues all
arose in Canada – RE/FiT.
1.

Definition of a Subsidy

WTO law defines a subsidy as: (1) any form of financial
contribution104 by a government or private body, where the latter
is ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ by government, whether in the form of (i)
a direct transfer of funds, (ii) a decision to forego revenue that is
otherwise due, (iii) the provision of goods and services other than

101. Id. art. 22.4. Such retaliation may target goods other than those subject
to the dispute, and may implicate the suspension of obligations in other WTO
Agreements. Id. art. 22.3(b)-(c).
102. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA
[hereinafter TRIMS]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter SCMs].
103. Both of which are included in my use of the term “payment subsidies”
in the previous Part of this paper.
104. SMCs, supra note 102, art. 1.1.The SCMs lists the following forms of
“financial contribution:” direct transfers of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity
infusions); potential direct transfers of funds (e.g. loan guarantees); government
revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., tax credits);
provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure; and purchase of
goods. Id.
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general infrastructure,105 or (iv) an income or price support
scheme106; (2) which confers a “benefit” to the recipient, with
reference to applicable market benchmarks;107 provided (3) the
subsidy is “specific,” in that it is limited to a sufficiently narrow
category of enterprises.108
2.

Production Subsidies

The GATT codifies the core principle of national treatment,
which is incorporated, with some variation, in other WTO
Agreements.109 National treatment prohibits WTO Members from
treating imported products less favorably than “like” products. 110
This prohibition applies to any measure adversely affecting
imported products in law or in fact.111 In determining whether a
measure adversely affects ‘like’ imported products, a WTO panel
will typically assess the extent to which the measure at issue has
modified the “conditions of competition” in favor of the ‘like’
domestic product.112 In this context, likeness, is determined with

105. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1).
106. Id. art. 1.1(a)(2).
107. Id. art. 1.1(b).
108. See id. art. 2.
109. GATT, supra note 102, art. III.
110. Id. The GATT draws a distinction between “like” products and “directly
competitive and substitutable” products. This distinction does not appear in other
WTO Agreements. Id. art. III:b(2); See also General Agreement on Trade In
Services, art. XVII Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter GATS].The GATS
draws a distinction between like services and like service suppliers. More
fundamentally, for purposes of WTO dispute settlement, the GATT’s coverage is
far more extensive than the GATS, owing to an “agreement to disagree” in
Uruguay Round negotiations that resulted in the positive listing of GATS
commitments relative to the negative listing of GATT commitments. Where
disputes involve hybrid goods, this distinction becomes practically immaterial. Id.
111. Though the terms “de jure” and “de facto” do not appear in the text of
art. III, panels have read these into the provision since the days of the GATT 1947.
For an exhaustive account of this jurisprudence, and alternative approaches to de
facto discrimination under the GATT, see Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination
in World Trade Law National and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment—or Equal
Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921, 921–977 (2002).
112. Competition is explicitly mentioned in the Ad Note to GATT Art. III(2)
as relevant whenever the impact of a measure is assessed against “directly
competitive and substitutable” imported product. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade art. III(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
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respect to the following four criteria: (a) product end-uses; (b)
consumer tastes and preferences; (c) physical characteristics; and
(d) tariff classifications.113 The TRIMS Agreement, at Article 2,
clarifies the application of GATT Article III in the domain of traderelated investment measures.114
There are two important limitations to national treatment.
First, national treatment does not apply to government
procurement, defined as “laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to
commercial resale.”115 Second, national treatment does not apply
to production subsidies. The relevant provision of the GATT
contemplates that nothing in its terms seeks to “prevent the
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers.”116
Under the SCMs, such subsidies can be challenged, whether
unilaterally through countervailing duties or multilaterally
through WTO dispute settlement, insofar as they cause “adverse
effects” to a Member State, whether by causing injury to the

GATT 1947]. It has been extended to the Art. III(4) cases by the Appellate Body.
See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, ¶ 20, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted
Jan. 10, 2001); See also GATS, supra note 64, art. XVII(3).
113. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 20, 97,
WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1,
1996). Under the GATS, likeness is primarily determined with reference to the
nature and characteristics of the service transactions. See Panel Report,
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU (adopted Sept. 25,
1997) (as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:III, ¶
7.322).
114. Art. 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement reads: “Without prejudice to other
rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that
is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.”
TRIMS, supra note 102, art. 2.1.
115. GATT, supra note 102, art. III:8(a). National-like treatment obligations
apply depending on whether or not the Member State concerned is (i) a signatory
to the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and (ii) listed the
relevant government entity. GPA, Art. III. While all the disputing parties in
Canada – Renewables/FiT were GPA signatories, Canada had undertaken no
commitments in relation to the Ontario Power Authority. Canada’s annexes can
be accessed at Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm#cane [https://pe
rma.cc/VV5M-56EB].
116. GATT, supra note 102, art. III:8(b).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2

20

2016]

WTO AGREEMENTS & REG OF ENERGY MKTS 107

Member’s domestic industry, displacing or impeding the Member’s
export penetration in third markets, including the world market,
or otherwise nullifying or impairing the Member’s legitimate
market access expectations, where the improved market access
presumed to flow from a bound tariff reduction is undercut by
subsidization.117 It bears mentioning, in this context, that the
GATT “general exceptions” clause,118 which allows respondent
Members to justify otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures on
grounds necessary for or relating to environmental protection,
cannot be raised in the context of the SCMs.119
3.

Import-Substitution Subsidies

The SCMs specifies two forms of subsidies, export and importsubstitution subsidies, that are prohibited, irrespective of a
showing of adverse effects.120 Dispute settlement provisions are
shortened for disputes involving these alleged subsidies.121 Should
a WTO panel conclude that the challenged measure is indeed a
prohibited subsidy, the panel must request that “the subsidizing
Member withdraw the subsidy without delay.”122 Further,
specificity, the third definitional element of a subsidy, is presumed
for these prohibited subsidies. Import-substitution subsidies
effectively cover local content requirements, defined as: “subsidies
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”123 It is important
to note that a subsidy is deemed an import-substitution subsidy
inasmuch as it influences the recipient’s purchasing decisions.124
Accordingly, and perhaps confusingly, such subsidies can (and

117. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 5.
118. See GATT, supra note 102.
119. But see Hildreth, supra note 77, at 720-22.
120. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 3.
121. Id. art. 4.
122. Id. art. 4.7.
123. Id. art. 3.1(b). Art. 3.1(a) addresses “subsidies contingent, in law or in
fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export
performance, including those illustrated in Annex I.” Id. art. 3.1(a).
124. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures 19 (Univ. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 186, 2003), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1515&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/2ZUQ-BWJ2].
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often are) conferred to producers.125 The genesis of these two
prohibited subsidies is unclear. Further, the original GATT treaty
expressed a permissive attitude towards import-substitution
subsidies in particular. Be that as it may, in WTO parlance importsubstitution subsidies, in recalibrating domestic purchasers away
from imports and towards domestic purchases, are deemed to have
a sufficiently “deleterious effect” on international trade.126
Juxtaposing the treatment, under WTO law, of production
subsidies with import-substitution subsidies reveals a striking
paradoxical feature of international trade regulation: as one
leading trade authority frames the issue, “a per unit subsidy to all
domestic buyers of a good can be completely equivalent in its
effects to an equal per unit subsidy to all domestic sellers – net
output of domestic producers, net imports, and the net price to
buyers will be exactly the same under competitive conditions.”127
Illogical as it may seem, this distinction played out fully in Canada
– RE/FiT.
4.

Market Definition

As a practical matter, governments tend to avoid publishing
information on the size and scope of subsidy programs. This
presents a challenge for complainants seeking to approximate the
amount of a subsidy. Such approximation can be useful, where
complainants wish to seek permission from the DSB to initiate
adequate countermeasures.128 In addition to being limited to the
level of economic harm caused by the offending subsidy at issue,
such countermeasures, importantly, also cannot exceed the
amount of the subsidy.129 The SCMs directs complainants to
calculate the benefit conferred by subsidies relative to market
benchmarks.130 The Appellate Body has previously cautioned, in
125. They do not, for this reason, transform into “production subsidies.”
126. RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 201 (3d ed. 2015).
127. See Sykes, supra note 124, at 19.
128. In one decision, a WTO arbitrator authorized a complainant Member to
retaliate against the respondent Member, the United States, to the tune of the
value of the subsidy in its entirety. See Decision by the Arbitrator, United States
– Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, ¶ 6.10, WTO Doc.
WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002).
129. DSU, supra note 91, art. 22.4.
130. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 14.
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respect of such calculations, that “[a] ‘benefit’ does not exist in the
abstract.”131 Rather, it must be measured against verifiable
market benchmarks. Such market benchmarks must reflect
undistorted competition, if they are to give a true picture of the
quantity of the subsidy.132 Given the discussion of the role of
governments in shaping electricity markets above, this proved to
be challenging in Canada – RE/FiT.
Accordingly, the SCMs directs that government provision of
capital is measured against the metric of the usual investment
practices of private investors.133 Similarly, government loans and
loan guarantees are measured against the amount that the
recipients would pay to obtain a comparable loan or loan guarantee
in commercial markets.134 Last, the provision of goods or services,
and the purchase of goods, by government, are measured in
relation to market conditions for the goods or services in question
in the country of provision or purchase.135 Such market conditions
include, notably, price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation, in addition to any other material conditions of
sale.136
The calculation of a benefit must ordinarily involve a
comparison of prices of the subsidized good against the prices of
‘like’ unsubsidized good in the same market.137 Where the home
market is competitively distorted, due for instance to the heavy
hand of government in shaping market conditions, the situation is
trickier. The Appellate Body has previously allowed complainants
to use third-country prices for like goods, with necessary

131. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 154, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug 20, 1999).
132. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic
Random Access Memories from Korea, ¶ 172, WT/DS336/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17,
2007).
133. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 14(a).
134. Id. art. 14(b)-(c).
135. Id. art. 14(d).
136. Id.
137. Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures
on Certain Products from China, ¶ 2.181, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted
Jan. 16, 2015).
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adjustments,138 or, where the product in question is a commodity
good, the world price of the good.139 In Canada – RE/FiT, neither
the home benchmarks nor permitted alternatives proved
appropriate to calculate the benefit provided by electricity.
5.

Canada – RE/FiT

Ontario deregulated electricity prices in 2003.140 That same
year, the Ontario government announced targets of incorporating
1350 MW of RE generation into grid by 2007, up to 2700 MW by
2010.141 To facilitate this task, the government passed legislation
creating the Ontario Power Authority (OPA), tasked with
procuring electricity generation in the newly deregulated
market.142 Ontario enacted two series of laws to incentivize RE
increased generation, the Renewable Energy Supply (RES)
initiatives, which it later replaced with the Renewable Energy
Standard Offer Program (RESOP).143 The RES was solicited, in
essence, as an energy price auction. Some utility-scale solar
providers successfully bid for 20-year PPAs with the OPA.144 To
incentivize smaller-scale generators to enter the market, the
RESOP took the form of a standard offer, of C$0.11/kWh (nonsolar); C$0.42/kWh (solar).145 Response to the RESOP was tepid,
particularly from solar PV generators.146 Accordingly, the

138. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 89, WTO
Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004).
139. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS103/AB/RW2,
WT/DS113/AB/RW2 (adopted Dec. 20, 2002).
140. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 28. For a detailed account (though one that
attributes deregulation as having begun in May 2002), see Michael Trebilcock &
Roy Hrab, Electricity Restructuring In Ontario, 26 ENERGY J. 123 (2005).
141. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 31.
142. Id. at 31.
143. Id. at 31-34.
144. Id. at 31-32.
145. Id. at 33.
146. JULIE MACARTHUR, EMPOWERING ELECTRICITY: CO-OPERATIVES,
SUSTAINABILITY, AND POWER SECTOR REFORM IN CANADA 107-108 (2016), https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/303876616 [https://perma.cc/5CZL-JNMM]
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government legislated the Green Energy and Green Economy Act
of 2009, which directed the OPA to design a FiT regulation.147
Pricing under the FiT regulation was increased significantly
from RESOP pricing. RE generators stood to receive payments in
a range from C$10.3 cents/kWh to C$80.2 cents/kWh: wind projects
received either C$13.5 cents/kWh (for onshore) or C$19.0
cents/kWh (for offshore), with some (20%) escalation for inflation,
whereas solar projects received between C$44.3 cents/kWh to
C$80.2 cents/kWh (depending on size and technology), with no
escalation.148 In exchange for these prices, generators were
required to satisfy so-called “Minimum Required Domestic Content
Levels” (MRDCL) requirements, requiring them to source labor
and capital costs, notably electricity generation equipment, from
the Ontario market.149 The MRDCL for the development and
construction of wind facilities was 25% from 2009 to 2011, up to
50% from 2012.150 For solar, the MRDCL was 50% from 2009 to
2010, up to 60% from 2011.151 For distributive solar under
Ontario’s so-called “microFiT” regulation, the MRDCL was 40%
from 2009 to 2010, up to 60% from 2011.152
Japan and the European Union, suppliers of RE electricity
generation equipment, called foul and challenged two aspects of
Ontario’s FiT regulation before a WTO panel: the conditioning of
eligibility for the FiT and microFiT regulations on the MRDCLs,
which the complainants characterized as import-substitution
measures; and the remuneration offered to qualifying RE
generators under the FiT and microFiT pricing schedules, which
the complainants mischaracterized as import-substitution

147. See Hogan, supra note 23, ¶¶ 30-34.
148. See id. ¶¶ 24-25. One important point to note is that these costs are
passed onto customers, by way of a “Global Adjustment” reflected in customer
bills, in Ontario’s case. Id.
149. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 1.4.
tbl.1. Distributive solar sold back to the grid by customers is tracked using socalled “net metering,” a billing mechanism that credits distributive solar system
owners for the electricity they add to the grid. See Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY
INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering [https://
perma.cc/6U7C-V7HP].
150. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 1.4.
tbl.1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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measures.153 The complainants, essentially, sought to link the FiT
and microFiT pricing to the purchases of the electricity generation
equipment to establish a relationship between the MRDCLs and
FiT/microFiT pricing, although it was clear that the latter
functioned closer to production subsidies. Be that as it may, the
complainants contended that these MRDCLs violated the GATT
and TRIMS national treatment obligations.154 Canada, citing the
government procurement exemption, argued that it was not bound
by the relevant national treatment obligations.155
On FiT and microFiT pricing, the complainants contended
that FiT and microFiT payments exceeded the wholesale (spot
market) rates charged by the grid operator.156 The complainants
contended that these spot market rates were appropriate
benchmarks, for purposes of assessing the “benefit” conferred by
the measures.157 Canada denied that either program met the
definitional elements of the WTO subsidy test, having regard to
the proper benchmarks, which, in Canada’s view, were the rates
for both wind and solar electricity established through an arm’slength transaction between private entities in Ontario.158 Canada
also seemed to suggest that such rates were reflected in its FiT and
microFiT pricing, insofar as RE generators would have sought to
negotiate these rates in the absence of either program.159
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s determination that the
FiT and microFiT regulations fell outside the scope of the
government procurement exception, and thus violated the national
treatment obligations, albeit on very different terms.160 The panel
had found that the exception was unavailable to Canada, having

153. Id. ¶ 5.6. To clarify, the complainants sought to argue that the FiT and
microFiT regulations, by virtue of their link to MRDCLs, were importsubstitution measures, as distinct from “actionable” subsidies. Presumably, they
did so owing to the quicker compliance period required of a respondent Member
when it is found to have conferred prohibited subsidies.
154. Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.72, 7.797.80.
155. Id. ¶ 7.86(ff).
156. Id. ¶¶ 7.30, 7.251, 7.255.
157. Id. ¶¶ 7.253, 7.256.
158. Id. ¶ 7.259.
159. Id. ¶ 7.263.
160. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶
5.128.
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regard to the fact that the electricity purchased by OPA was being
procured “with a view to commercial resale” by reason of the profit
made by the government on resale of electricity to customers, and
because such sales were being made in competition with private
operators.161 Accordingly, the panel found that the MRDCLs
violated the relevant national treatment provisions.162 An
important intermediate finding made by the panel, in this regard,
concerned the link between the electricity generating equipment to
which the MRDCLs applied, and the electricity which the
government was actually procuring.163 The panel considered, on
this point, that there was a sufficiently “close relationship”
between these two goods.164
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel’s analysis,
focusing instead on the language in the GATT on the government
procurement exception addressing the “products purchased.”165
For the Appellate Body, this reference had to be understood in
relation to GATT Article III’s ‘like’ product analysis.166
Accordingly, for the derogation to apply, “the product of foreign
origin [electricity generating equipment] must be in a competitive
relationship with the product purchased,” electricity.167 In the
absence of such a competitive relationship the MRDCLs could not
qualify for the exception.168
Turning to the FiT and microFiT regulations, the Appellate
Body upheld the panel’s finding that these constituted financial
contributions in the form of “government purchases of goods,”169

161. Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.1497.167.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶ 7.127.
164. Id. Arwel Davies argues that the “sufficiently close” language was not a
condition, but rather represented obiter dictum for the panel. See Arwel Davies,
The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement Derogation and Canada – Renewable
Energy, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 543, 545 (2015). To support this contention, she points
to language at paragraph 7.127 suggesting that the contractual relationship
between the MRDCLS and electricity procurement governed on this issue. Id.
165. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶
5.63.
166. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 5.74.
168. Id. ¶ 5.79.
169. Id. ¶ 5.128.
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namely electricity, but reversed the panel’s findings that the
complainants had failed to meet the burden of proof in relation to
their claim that the FiT and microFiT regulations were prohibited
subsidies.170 Despite this finding, the Appellate Body would
declare itself unable to positively resolve the claim (“complete its
analysis,” in WTO jargon), as the panel had not meaningfully
analyzed relevant evidence on the record.171 The panel, while
accepting that both programs involved “government purchases of
goods” for purposes of the first definitional element of a subsidy
outlined in the previous subsection, had split 2:1 on the issue of the
proper benchmark for the second definitional element, concerning
“benefit.”172 It is instructive to contrast the three approaches taken
in the Canada – RE/FiT proceedings, as they are all plausible.
The panel majority considered that the wholesale rates were
an inappropriate benchmark, as the significant degree of
government intervention in the market rendered these rates an
unreliable proxy for competitive counterfactual rates.173 In so
doing, the majority noted that the use of counterfactual wholesale
rates would in any event drive RE-generated electricity out of the
market.174 The majority considered that an appropriate
benchmark would take into account the particular government
policies regarding Ontario’s electricity market, including notably:
(i) the elimination of coal-fired generators by 2014; (ii) the
resultant need for replacement capacity; and (iii) the need for such
replacement capacity to come from RE sources.175 Against these
caveats, the majority considered that an appropriate benchmark
could be satisfied by
comparing the terms and conditions of the challenged FIT and
microFIT Contracts with the terms and conditions that would be
offered by commercial distributors of electricity acting under a
government-imposed obligation to acquire electricity from
generators operating solar PV and wind power plants of a

170.
171.
5.219.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. ¶ 5.219.
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶
Id.
Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶ 7.320.
Id.
Id.
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comparable scale
Programme.176

to

those

functioning

under

the

FIT

The dissent, while agreeing that Ontario’s wholesale rates
were too distorted to serve as market benchmarks, disagreed with
the majority’s view that counterfactual wholesale rates were
inappropriate.177 For the dissent, the government’s policies were
irrelevant to the question of whether the FiT and microFiT
participants were receiving remuneration in excess of market
value. 178 Reviewing the record, however, the dissent agreed with
the majority that there was insufficient evidence to conduct a
proper benefit analysis.179
The Appellate Body considered that the panel majority’s
market benchmark was overbroad, inasmuch as it considered a
single market for electricity in Ontario without enquiring into the
source of the electricity, and conclusory, insofar as the panel’s
analysis ultimately ended, rather than beginning, with
identification of what, in the panel’s view, was the correct
benchmark.180 In the Appellate Body’s view, the panel failed to
properly consider supply-side factors, notably differences in cost
structures, operating costs and dispatch characteristics.181 For the
Appellate Body, the record demonstrated that, while conventional
electricity generation could exert price constraints on wind and
solar power, these RE sources could not do the reverse.182 The
Appellate Body considered that these supply side distinctions were

176. Id. at ¶ 7.322.
177. Id.; see Part IX.
178. Id. ¶ 9.3-9.10. At ¶ 9.14, the dissent considered that an appropriate
benchmark would “(i) represent prices established in competitive wholesale
electricity markets – that is, wholesale electricity markets that are not
significantly distorted by government intervention such as that in Ontario; and
(ii) must be adjusted to reflect the “prevailing market conditions” for electricity in
Ontario.”
179. Id. ¶ 9.16
180. The Appellate Body did not meaningfully address the dissenting
opinion, probably with good reason – as it seemed based on a misunderstanding
of the role of governments in electricity markets.
181. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶
5.171 (citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 7 ¶ 1121, WTO Doc.
WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted June 1, 2011)).
182. Id. ¶ 5.174.
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such that the markets for wind- and solar-generated electricity
could only exist because of government regulation.183 In this sense,
the Ontario government had created a new market for REgenerated energy. The Appellate Body rounded off its criticism of
the panel by pointing to the latter’s failure to consider that, while
customers at the retail level did not differentiate between different
electricity generated from conventional versus renewable sources,
the government clearly did for a host of policy reasons.184
According to the Appellate Body:
the benefit comparison under Article 1.1(b) should not be
conducted within the competitive wholesale electricity market as
a whole, but within competitive markets for wind- and solar PVgenerated electricity, which are created by the government
definition of the energy supply-mix. . . [such] comparison . . .
should be with the terms and conditions that would be available
under market-based conditions for each of these technologies,
taking the supply-mix as a given. 185

Having defined what it viewed as the correct benchmark, the
Appellate Body confirmed the panel’s assessment that Ontario
benchmarks were unreliable, on account of market-distortive
government interference.186 Underlining that a government’s
creation of a market is itself not a bar to the use of market
benchmarks, the Appellate Body considered that use of out-ofcountry benchmarks or constructed benchmarks, adjusted to
reflect the conditions of the market, would be permissible under
the circumstances.187 The Appellate Body did so likely knowing full
well how difficult it would be for the complainants to construct a
sufficiently robust counterfactual electricity market.188
In the absence of any remand authority under WTO dispute
rules, the Appellate Body tries to “complete its analysis” by
resolving those claims that a panel has incorrectly disposed of. The

183. Id. ¶ 5.175.
184. Id. ¶ 5.176.
185. Id. ¶ 5.190.
186. Id.
187. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, at ¶
5.185 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber IV, supra note 138, ¶ 103).
188. Id. ¶ 5.190. The complainants, furthermore, had submitted some
constructed benchmark data to the panel, which the latter had dismissed.
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Appellate Body does so in recognition that WTO litigation is
expensive, and time consuming. In this case, the Appellate Body
attempted to complete the panel’s analysis, relying on data the
European Union had submitted on wind- and solar-specific pricing
for Quebec’s FiT to the panel, in addition to price data for an early
precursor to Ontario’s FiT regulation, the Regulated Price Plan,
which had preceded Ontario’s deregulation of electricity prices in
2003.189 Problematically, these benchmarks all related to blended
electricity markets.190 As the Appellate Body could not bifurcate
this data between conventional and RE-generated electricity, the
Appellate Body determined that it was unable to apply this data to
its benchmark.191
C.

Assessment

The Appellate Body’s findings, buried beneath layers of trade
jargon, are of some significance – both in terms of their impact on
future procurement and subsidization practices in the WTO, and
in terms of the broader implications for production and importsubsidization subsidies in energy markets and beyond. I will
unpack these themes.
On the one hand, to get at the MRDCL import-substitution
measures that Canada attempted to cabin under the government
procurement exception, the Appellate Body unflinchingly stripped
away at some 70 years worth of Member State practice to narrow
the scope of this exemption through use of the GATT “like product”
analysis.192 To illustrate the implications of the Appellate Body’s
interpretation, I will use the example of a public authority’s
procurement of a highway pursuant to the United States Buy

189. Id. ¶ 5.192 (citing the relevant portion of the Panel Report).
190. Id. ¶ 5.180. Surprisingly, the European Union did not put forward a
strong argument for using German prices as a benchmark. The record suggests
that the European Union alluded to German prices only in response to a question
posed by the panel. Id. Although one can only speculate as to the European
Union’s motivations for doing so, it may be that it felt that German prices as they
were higher than desired.
191. Id. ¶ 5.246.
192. Id. ¶ 6.1(b)(I). The United States’ Buy America Act of 1933, for instance,
is one of many national laws directing public authorities to give preference to
locally produced goods for public infrastructure spending. Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C. § 8301 (2012).
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America Act.193 Under the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the
procurement exception, such authority, if procuring [locally
produced] steel to build a highway, may now be found to violate
national treatment obligations owed to foreign steel,
notwithstanding the lack of any “commercial resale” element. This
is because there is no competitive relationship to speak of between
the foreign steel being discriminated against, and the highway.194
Conceivably, the United States could tender thousands of
individual procurements for the infrastructure project to work
around this limitation. Even then, a crafty complainant Member
in a dispute request would have little difficulty arguing that the
United States was attempting to circumvent this newfound
limitation to the government procurement exception.
On the other hand, to cut the FiT and microFiT production
subsidies some slack, the Appellate Body’s findings on “benefit”
would seem to allow a Member State to subsidize uncompetitive
segments of a given market in a manner that alters the given
supply mix of goods in that market to the point that it has
effectively created a new market in the subsidized goods. Provided
the Member State does not pay in excess of the rate of return to
local producers, the measure may not provide any “benefit” to the
recipients. I will illustrate the implications of the Appellate Body’s
interpretation by using the example of ethanol. Assuming that
ethanol is more efficiently produced from sugar cane than corn, we
could fathom of a situation where a Member State seeks to ensure
a given level of corn-based ethanol in its ethanol supply mix – for
policy reasons we can further assume are valid. Were the Member
State to provide subsidies sufficient to effectively bifurcate the
market, a complainant Member would have to show that the
payments made to the corn producers exceeded their costs of
production and a reasonable rate of return. The relevant market,
in such an exercise, would be the market for corn-based ethanol.195

193. 41 U.S.C. § 8301.
194. See Davies, supra note 164, at 550. Davies suggests that a possible
refinement is that the exception remains applicable to physical inputs of the good
being procured, inasmuch as the electricity generating equipment was not a
physical input to electricity. However, she find this argument to be tenuous, given
that it elevates form over substance. Id.
195. Rajib Pal, Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada – Renewable
Energy/Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production
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Taking a step back, it is unclear that there were any principled
differences between the MRDCLs and FiT and microFiT
regulations. While the MRDCLs explicitly mandated the purchase
of local content, in the form of electricity generating equipment,
the FiT and microFiT regulations, in directing OPA to buy REgenerated electricity [necessarily] nearby the grid, likewise
afforded preferential access to locally sourced electricity.196
Although they implicate different products, the former operated as
a local content requirement in form; while the latter did so in
substance. Viewed in this light, the Appellate Body’s vastly
different conclusions seem somewhat anomalous. It bears
mentioning, in this regard, that the complainants sought to
highlight the inconsistency apparent in the panel’s finding that the
MRDCLs had conferred an “advantage” to Canadian industry
within the wording of the TRIMS,197 vis-à-vis the panel’s failure to
find that the FiT and microFiT regulations afforded Canadian
industry any “benefit.”198 The Appellate Body, resorting to the
Oxford English Dictionary (which it does when seeking to justify
an otherwise counterintuitive conclusion), found the scope of
“advantage” to be larger than, and encompassing, “benefit.”199
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR FIT, RPS AND EA
REGULATIONS
Trade scholars speculate that the Appellate Body’s findings on
market benchmarks were laden with policy considerations.
Various accounts of the Appellate Body’s purported motivations
are offered in the literature.200 The most convincing, in my view,
Subsidies? 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 125, 135-36 (2014). Pal uses the more farcical
example of subsidies to a Member’s local pineapple industry to drive the point
home.
196. See Rubini, supra note 16, at 553.
197. TRIMS, supra note 102, at annex 1, ¶ 1(a).
198. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶
5.205.
199. Id. ¶ 5.207 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting
the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 1377, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug.
20 1999).
200. Some, like Luca Rubini speculate that the Appellate Body, like the
panel majority before it, erred in conflating the question of the existence of a
subsidy with the question of the justification for the subsidy. See Luca Rubini,
‘The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.’ Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis
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suggests that the Appellate Body, while possibly being mindful of
the broader policy implications of exposing Member Countries’
energy markets to challenges, came to an unsurprising conclusion,
given the partisan nature of dispute settlement proceedings:
disputing parties tend to concern themselves more with submitting
benchmarks that, in widening or narrowing net subsidization, best

from the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48(5) J. WORLD
TRADE 895, 917 (2014). This criticism may well be true. However, it overlooks that
the SCMs itself draws no meaningful distinction between the existence and
justification of a subsidy: insofar as a subsidy is found to exist, it matters not that
a subsidy is “good” in the sense of correcting a market externality, which RE
subsidies arguably do, and subsidies that are “bad” in the sense of propping up
failing industries in a manner that distorts world market prices. United States
and European agricultural subsidies being a prime example of such subsidies. For
a brief (but clear) discussion of some of the treaty-based alternatives WTO
Members could have pursued to allow for more “policy space” in the clean energy
context, see ROBERT HOWSE, SECURING POLICY SPACE FOR CLEAN ENERGY UNDER
THE SCM AGREEMENT: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES (2013), http://e15initiative.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-CETs-Howse-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q5WGXRV]. Howse proposes converting import-substitution subsidies for clean energy
from prohibited to actionable. Once an alleged program is shown to satisfy the
definitiona l elements of a subsidy, it is countervailable provided it causes some
form of adverse effects on a complainant. Seen in this light, and against the
backdrop of the utter collapse of the WTO’s negotiations pillar following the failed
Doha Development Round of trade negotiations, it is perhaps inevitable that
panels would attempt to tilt the scales of justice one way or another in a “hard
case” such as this one. Id. at 4. Others, like Elizabeth Whitsitt, suggest that the
Appellate Body was mindful of possible tensions with investment law, inasmuch
as WTO-mandated changes to the FiT and microFiT regulations may have
resulted in Canada shafting foreign investors. See Elizabeth Whitsitt, A Modest
Victory at the WTO for Ontario’s FIT Program, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
75, 99-101 (2013). Whitsitt highlights the Mesa Power litigation as an example of
less dramatic changes to Ontario’s FiT programs that resulted in arbitral
proceedings over alleged arbitrary allocation of preferences under the FiT
following some legislative amendments thereto. See Mesa Power Grp., LLC v.
Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2012-17 (PCA Case Repository Mar. 24, 2016)
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7240.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q87T-U28X]. It bears mentioning that Mesa lost this dispute, on a 2:1
split. Id. Whitsitt’s argument may also well be true. However, it is difficult to
know for sure: certainly, nothing on the record indicates that the panel or
Appellate Body were concerned over the non-WTO law knock-on effects of their
reports. The international legal order has unquestionably grown fragmented over
the last three or so decades, and while it would be good of the Appellate Body to
take an integrationist approach to dispute settlement, the “spaghetti bowl” of
investment law treaties, numbering in excess of 3000 globally, makes this a
daunting task. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015 - REFORMING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 115-116 (2015), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir2015 _en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9R3-S27W].
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support their arguments, and less with constructing an objectively
“fair” benchmark.201 In this vein, it is certainly true that WTO
panels are constrained by the evidence on the record. If the right
counterfactual does not exist, a panel can do little other than find
that the complainants have failed to make their case.
A. Market Definition Matters
Whatever the reason, it bears mentioning that the Appellate
Body has never explicitly reversed itself or openly modified its
prior reasoning on a legal question in its more than 20 years of
existence.202 Having said this, while the Appellate Body’s
motivations do not matter, it is nevertheless critically important to
unpack precisely what the Appellate Body held in Canada –
RE/FiT. A broad and purposive interpretation of the Canada –
RE/FiT report might lead one to assess that the Appellate Body
green-lighted production subsidies, provided these can be
separated from any accompanying local content requirements.
Such requirements, by operation of GATT and TRIMS national
treatment clauses, can be found WTO-inconsistent by a panel even
where a complainant might now struggle to establish a
subsidization claim.
A narrower interpretation would focus on the contours of the
Appellate Body’s benchmark analysis. Market analyses are not
novel to WTO litigation – as WTO disputes continue to grow in size
and complexity, parties have increasingly litigated fact-intensive
questions of competitive market counterfactuals.203 Further, no
two markets are the same: what the Appellate Body held in
relation to the duopolistic world market for large civil aircrafts in

201. Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2013, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
475, 508-10 (2014).
202. For an account of more subtle changes to the Appellate Body’s
methodology see Frieder Roessler, Changes in the Jurisprudence of the WTO
Appellate Body During the Past Twenty Years (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced
Studies Resear, Paper No. RSCAS 2015/72, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673466 [https://perma.cc/6UHJ-JD75].
203. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted
Mar. 23, 2012); see generally Appellate Body Reports, European Communities and
Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, supra
note 109.
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one case will probably not all be applicable to its analysis of the
world market for cotton in another case, let alone its assessment of
a provincial electricity market in Canada in yet a different case.
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the Ontario electricity market, in
turn, may not color its analysis of, say, the California market in a
future WTO challenge to California’s RPS regulation, or, for
instance, the Brazilian market in an analogous challenge to
Brazil’s EA regulation.204
In Canada – RE/FiT, the Appellate Body gave more weight to
differences in supply-side distinctions between conventional and
RE generators to find that, the similarity of demand-side
characteristics notwithstanding, these generators supplied
different markets. Starting with the Appellate Body’s supply-side
distinctions, it does not necessarily follow that RE-generated
electricity does not constrain the market behavior of conventional
generators. I indicated in Part II of this paper that RE-generated
energy in a FiT regulation, owing to its “must take” characteristics,
has a price suppressive effect on wholesale electricity prices – on
the Ontario grid and, presumably, in most other jurisdictions with
FiT regulations. If the Appellate Body were referring to a
hypothetical Ontario market, absent the FiT and microFiT
regulations, its findings would make more sense. Even here,
however, it will not always be a given that RE-generated electricity
cannot constrain conventional electricity pricing in the absence of
a FiT regulation: negative bids from wind-generated energy in the
Texas wholesale markets, for instance, are reportedly driving
conventional generators out of the market.205 Further, if we buy
the Appellate Body’s reasoning on supply-side constraints, one
could push market segmentation even further: for instance, it
takes nuclear and coal-fired plants a full day to power up. In a
competitive market, such plants could not easily react to constrain
the behavior of gas-fired turbine plants, by ramping up or down. It
does not necessarily follow that this further splits electricity
markets between these base and intermediate load plants. In this

204. Both described in INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (IRENA) & CLEAN
ENERGY MINISTERIAL (CEM), RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS—A GUIDE TO DESIGN
(2015), http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Auc
tions_Guide_2015_6_liabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KJU-LD5G].
205. See Huntowski, supra note 74, at 6.
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sense, one could argue that the panel majority’s benchmark was
more intellectually honest: it openly acknowledged that
government policy sought to correct environmental externalities,
and accepted that this policy warranted market segmentation.206
Turning to the demand-side distinctions, the Appellate Body
bifurcated the demand-side market between retail and wholesale
(government) buyers to highlight that there were, in fact, some
demand-side distinctions between conventional- and RE-generated
energy. It is indeed true, as I indicated in Part II above, that
electricity is, physically, identical. Yet, the Appellate Body did not
need to segment its buyer-side analysis to come to this conclusion:
customers are increasingly environmentally conscious. To address
these concerns, electricity distributors have, in recent years,
marketed a range of green energy tariffs.207 While it is suggested
in the literature that such tariffs may reflect more of a marketing
gimmick than a response to consumer tastes,208 this might not hold
true in energy markets such as California’s, where residents
proactively require that their electricity come from renewables,
and are willing to pay higher energy bills. It becomes difficult
otherwise to explain the overwhelming support for the 50% RPS
target announced by Governor Jerry Brown on October 7, 2015.209
Having emphasized that market definition matters for
prospective respondent Members, it bears emphasizing that
206. Absent such segmentation, one can fathom of a situation where a
foreign supplier of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) turbines relies on demandside synergies and the lack of pertinent supply-side distinctions to pressure its
government to initiate a challenge against those states in the United States that
subsidize their coal generators under a theory that these generators are being
subsidized relative to gas-fired generators, in a manner that hurts NGCC exports.
Provided that the benchmark price in such a challenge can be established as the
wholesale price for electricity, such a challenge could conceivably succeed.
207. See, e.g., LETHA TAWNEY ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., EMERGING GREEN
TARIFFS IN U.S. REGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2016), http://www.wri.org/
sites/default/files/Emerging_Green_Tariffs_in_US_Regulated_Electricity_Marke
ts.pdf [https://perma.cc/97X4-C3LF] (listing examples of green energy tariffs
electricity distributors have marketed).
208. AMAR BRECKENRIDGE & DAVID FOSTER, A MATTER OF DEFINITION:
COMMENTARY OF ASPECTS OF THE APPELLATE BODY’S RULING ON THE CANADARENEWABLE ENERGY CASE IN THE WTO 4 (2013) http://worldtradelaw.typepad.
com/files/fit_definition.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD6Z-BUD9].
209. S.B. 350, 2015 Leg., ch. 547, 93 (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB350
[https://perma.cc/4ENQ-TYS7].
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identifying proper benchmarks will be difficult for prospective
complainant Members. For one, the Appellate Body may well have
ruled wholesale electricity prices out as proper benchmarks in any
future WTO challenge to RE electricity prices in a FiT, RPS or EA
regulation, given the Appellate Body’s implicit recognition that
counterfactuals should allow for a reasonable rate of return on
firms’ capital investments, which marginal cost recovery in the
spot market does not allow for.210 Such benchmarks would thus
need to address the “missing money” problem discussed in Part II
of this paper. This is an eminently reasonable position, and one
that is aligned with the reality that the electricity market is, quite
simply, not your typical commodity market.
In constructing any benchmark prices, it is important to recall
that there is no such thing as a perfectly competitive electricity
market – they are all regulated to some degree. This renders any
constructed electricity market benchmarks arbitrary to some
degree. Such models, and the assumptions contained therein, are
sure to be open to various points of attack by experts adduced by
respondents. One possible point of attack, as I mentioned in Part
II, is that deregulation initiatives in emerging economies have all
yielded “dual markets.” Such dual markets are acknowledged in
the literature as representing rational equilibrium points.211
Precisely how a prospective complainant Member would construct
a viable dual market, with solvent private operators and insolvent
public suppliers, will be interesting to track in future disputes. If
the arbitrary nature of constructed benchmarks is off-putting
enough to spur a prospective complainant to first seek to identify
a real market, the need for proper benchmarks to take supply
mixes as a given makes life even more difficult: how many
jurisdictions pursue the same or similar supply mixes?212 And

210. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18,
¶ 5.175. In so doing, the Appellate Body would seem to distance itself from the
dissent’s view that wholesale market prices could serve as an appropriate
benchmark.
211. See HELLER & VICTOR, supra note 34.
212. Indeed, the Appellate Body acknowledged that such complainants
would likely have to resort to economic models – which brings us back full circle
to the problem of arbitrary benchmarks. See Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Renewables/FiT, supra note 18.
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within such jurisdictions, how many will operate the same type of
energy procurement regulation?
B. FiT v RPS and EA Regulations
On balance, FiT, RPS and EA regulations, where they lack
local content requirements, are now relatively insulated from WTO
challenges. Where a respondent Member is challenged on FiT
pricing, it may now argue, in line with the Appellate Body’s
findings in Canada – RE/FiT, that its interventions in the market,
spurred by pro-environment policies or considerations, have led to
the creation of a new market for RE-generated energy.
Accordingly, its FiT pricing should be assessed against
hypothetically competitive RE-generated electricity prices, subject
to the “terms and conditions that would be available under marketbased conditions for each of these technologies, taking the supplymix as a given”213 This not only adds a layer of complexity for a
complainant Member: it invariably raises counterfactual prices.
RPS and EA regulations are even more insulated from a WTO
challenge. Before a complainant Member can even tackle the
complexities of establishing an appropriate benchmark to show the
existence of any benefit to recipients, it need first show, in
subsidies challenge to an RPS regulation, that such regulation
resulted in a “financial contribution.” The same considerations
that led the panel in Canada – RE/FiT to find that the Ontario
government was purchasing goods, are arguably lacking in an RPS
regulation214 while publicly-owned utilities may be covered by RPS
obligations, they apply with equal force to IOUs. While the
argument can be made that such private bodies are being
‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ to purchase electricity by the government,
it bears mentioning that the Appellate Body has never upheld any
findings under this definitional provision, preferring instead to
broaden the scope of a “public body” than opening the Pandora’s
Box of bringing private party action within the purview of SCMs
litigation.215 Assuming, arguendo, that a complainant establishes
213. Id. ¶ 5.190.
214. An EA regulation would feature a government purchaser.
215. The Appellate Body has made various obiter remarks on SCMs article
1.1(a)(iv), notably alluding to its anti-circumvention purposes, without ever
positively finding any instances of entrustment or direction in appeals to date.
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a financial contribution; with respect to an RPS regulation, where
the only or predominant purchasers in a market are public bodies;
and with respect to an EA regulation for that very reason, it will
still have to establish that the prices negotiated with RE
generators are supra competitive. As RPS and EA regulations are
designed to be market-driven, this is a tall order to meet.
Canada – RE/FiT thus sets an encouraging precedent for
governments (as respondents) and RE industries. Prior to the
dispute, cautious governments may have preferred implementing
RPS or EA regulations to FiT regulations, on the understanding
that the former two are less likely to be found trade distortive than
the latter. Following Canada – RE/FiT, these governments –
insofar as they can afford it – can safely provide FiT regulations
safe in the knowledge that they are, to some degree, insulated from
a WTO challenge.216 I qualify the statement with “to some degree”
as, paradoxically, it would seem that they fall into a certain ‘safe
harbor’ if they can sufficiently distort the electricity market to the
point where it may be shown, objectively, that a new market for
RE-generated electricity has been created. Governments that are
unable to do so might still be exposed to wholesale electricity
benchmark prices, although such prices might have to be adjusted
to reflect reasonable rates of return. The need to sufficiently distort
a market would seem to privilege developed Member States with
deeper pockets than developing Member States, although the
counter-argument can certainly be made that some level of
subsidization of RE-generated electricity, falling short of creating
a new market, is less likely to cause a given respondent Member’s
trading partners any adverse effects of the type normally required
before a complainant Member can seek to impose countermeasures
in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION
RE-generated electricity is a critically important component of
states’ commitment, under the UNFCC Paris Accord, to curb
See generally, on the anti-circumvention purposes, Appellate Body Report, US –
Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 88, ¶ 52.
216. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18.
In practice, countries are increasingly viewing EA regulations as a more costeffective alternative to FiT regulations.
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anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to below disastrous levels
in the course of the next century. The WTO’s 164 Member States
will all have to deliver on this commitment, if the world is to avoid
some of the gloomier projections of a world that has warmed by in
excess of 2 degrees Celsius from present-day average global
temperatures. The WTO and its Secretariat staff are fully aware
of this.217 The importance of sustainably incorporating RE
generators onto national grids by Members, in this regard, cannot
be understated.
Electricity markets are all, more or less, reaching an inflection
point, where regulators are revisiting ways to best incorporate REgenerated energy on wholesale electricity markets. This is a task
that, amongst other things, must result in a level playing field
between conventional and RE generators. Conventional generators
in certain markets have enjoyed embedded privileges. In the
United States, for instance, many utilities have fully amortized
their facilities equipment, and are much better placed to absorb
marginal cost pricing when bidding in spot markets than new
market entrants. RE generators, as new entrants to the market, in
turn cannot compete with conventional generators without
government support. They are most vulnerable to the “missing
money” problem.
Government support to remedy this problem has, typically,
come in the form of FiT, RPS or EA regulations, requiring public
bodies and encouraging private bodies to enter into long-term
PPAs with RE generators at contract rates sufficiently attractive
to allow investors a reasonable rate of return. These programs are
sometimes reinforced with various other types of incentives,
notably tax incentives and payment subsidies, some of which
incorporate local content requirements. Such incentives may raise
issues under the WTO GATT, TRIMS and SCMs Agreements.
Local content requirements are simply not tolerated under
WTO law. Production subsidies, on the other hand, are fine in
principle. Before Canada – RE/FiT, it was understood that
production subsidies were actionable by prospective complainant
Members, where they cause adverse effects. In Canada – RE/FiT,
the Appellate Body tightened disciplines relating to permissible
217. It bears mentioning that WTO HQ in Geneva is resourced with state of
the art recycling facilities!
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government procurement, but loosened disciplines relating to
production subsidies.
The Appellate Body, in its benchmark analysis of the Ontario
market, has created a safe harbor for RE production subsidies, in
introducing a significant evidentiary hurdle for complainants to
cross if they are to succeed in any challenge to production
subsidies. Such complainants will have to show that RE generators
are being remunerated in excess of whatever rates, inclusive of a
reasonable rate of return, would prevail in the RE electricity
segment of the market (a separate and newly created market),
taking the allegedly subsidizing Member’s supply mix as a given.
The need to scour through potentially confidential company-level
financial data to obtain the requisite rate of return information to
calculate market benchmarks, let alone the complexities involved
in constructing such benchmarks, makes it less likely that
Members will challenge each other’s electricity markets in the
future.
Scholars disagree on the Appellate Body’s motivations.
Further, its market analysis probably had some economists
seething with rage. Ultimately, none of these aspects matter: only
the Appellate Body’s holding matters. The takeaway from this is
that FiT, RPS and EA regulations are now insulated from a WTO
challenge. One implication is that, inasmuch as cautious
governments preferred RPS or EA regulations for fear of having a
FiT characterized as a subsidy, such Member States will be
released of those fears. It is doubtful that Canada – RE/FiT will
lead to an onslaught of FiTs, given the considerable costs to
consumers they entail. Further, anecdotal evidence indicates that
countries, particularly in Latin America, are increasingly
preferring EA regulations to FiT regulations.218 It may well be that
developing countries will instead be more emboldened to enact
aggressive EA regulations, safe from the possibility of a WTO
challenge.
Whatever the energy procurement regulation chosen, provided
such Members can show that they are supporting RE-generated
electricity through them for environmental purposes, and that,

218. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POLICY UPDATED 2-4 (2016), https://
www.iea.org/media/pams/repolicyupdate/REDRenewablePolicyUpdateNo920160
405.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2T4-GX2J]. But see text at note 45.
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absent such support, RE generators could not compete in the
wholesale market for electricity (something that the historical
development of electricity markets fully supports), they are free to
remunerate RE generators well in excess of these wholesale
market prices. This is a significant development for energy
markets, and one that may well spur governments to experiment
with bolder RE subsidies in the future, with a view to testing the
bounds or upper limits of the Appellate Body’s findings in Canada
– RE/FiT. There are definitely fast times ahead for RE generators,
energy regulators, their governments, and their trading partners.
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